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I. INTRODUCTION 
Post 2008 financial crisis, more and more people are being drawn to 
start-ups and the promise of fortune that being an entrepreneur can provide. 
As these people flock to Silicon Valley, it is the modern-day gold rush. In 
the wake of computer giants, social media giants have sprouted up, and now 
so has ride sharing. The buzz word being thrown around all of these billion-
dollar ideas is disruptive. Every new entrepreneur is looking to disrupt a 
current market with his or her life-altering idea. Obviously, not everything 
can be disruptive, but are all of the ideas gaining traction being labeled as 
disruptive truly disruptive? The answer is no. Disruption has become one of 
the most overused terms when discussing innovation and it has also become 
one of the most incorrectly used terms. 
This paper examines the development of the transformative innovation 
of mobile money in the developing world. Mobile money is a product that 
first sprouted up shortly after the turn of the century and has been 
experimented with in over forty developing countries around the world. 
Half of the world’s population does not have access to a bank account and 
mobile money seeks to include this forgotten half in the financial services 
industry. Mobile money allows users to deposit cash at a local agent, who 
then puts an equal amount of credit on the user’s mobile phone. That user 
can then use his or her mobile handset to conduct financial transactions 
such as transfers, bill payment, loan re-payment, or just be an alternative 
currency holding place to underneath the mattress. 
If half the world is not plugged in to the financial network, there is a 
staggering amount of economic activity being left on the table. Mobile 
money has the ability to bring all of these individuals into the network and 
push economic activity to new heights. Seems pretty amazing, so the 
question becomes is mobile money disruptive? Analyzing mobile money 
through the lens of disruption theory, first promulgated by Professor 
Clayton Christensen of Harvard Business School, this paper will look 
beneath the surface of mobile money, examining both the economic and 
regulatory factors, to see if mobile money is a true disruptive innovation. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF DISRUPTION THEORY AND ITS PROPER 
CONTEXT AND USAGE 
Today’s start-up world is full of glitz and glamour, where 
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists alike label the next new “it” 
technology a disruptive innovation. But is this a correct label?1 Professor 
                                                          
 1 Clayton M. Christensen et al., What is Disruptive Innovation, 93 HARV. BUS. REV. 44, 
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Clayton Christensen of Harvard Business School, one of the innovators of 
disruption theory, certainly thinks the label in most cases is likely 
incorrect.2 If the innovator of disruption theory thinks the label is incorrect, 
then what actually constitutes a disruptive innovation? According to 
Christensen, disruption occurs when incumbents in an industry begin to 
move upstream by providing current or improved products and services to 
their most demanding customers (generally the most profitable too), which 
allows the company to make higher profit margins.3 By doing so, the 
incumbents ignore certain segments of the market, commonly the low-end 
where profits are small.4 New entrants see the low-end as exposed and enter 
the market, offering products and services that meet the specific needs of 
these customers.5 It is likely that the customer base of the incumbents view 
the offerings of the new entrants as inferior and a poor fit for their current 
needs, so the incumbents do not respond to the threat to profitability posed 
by the new entrants.6 New entrants will then attempt to move upmarket and 
offer the same performance to the incumbent’s customer base.7 It is when 
the mainstream customers of the incumbents start adopting the new 
entrant’s products and services in volume that disruption has occurred.8 
Therefore, new technology that solves a need or helps businesses engage 
their customers in more meaningful ways is not per se disruptive, disruption 
is about the process.9 
There are two ways for new entrants to enter the market: by 
establishing a low-end foothold or by creating a new market foothold.10 A 
low-end foothold develops when incumbents continue to enhance their 
products and services to meet the need of their most demanding customers, 
and as a result often far exceed the needs of their less demanding customers 
in the low-end.11 This allows new entrants to introduce just “good enough” 
products which are typically less expensive and appeal to the more price 
sensitive low-end consumers.12 The new market foothold develops because 
the new entrant creates a new market where there was not one in the first 
place.13 The new entrants are able to convert “nonconsumers into 
                                                                                                                                      
45 (2015) (“Unfortunately, disruption theory is in danger of becoming victim of its own 
success.”). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. at 46. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. at 47. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 47. 
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consumers.”14 
It is difficult for managers of incumbent companies to spot a disruptive 
innovation because the potential revenues for the market are small, and the 
products and services are not what current customers are asking for.15 
Additionally, mainstream consumers are not likely to use disruptive 
products in a way they know or understand because the new product has 
attributes that are unattractive to the mainstream consumers and these 
attributes do not perform as well at first.16 A great example of this is how 
Apple disrupted the personal computer market with their continued 
development of the iPhone.17 At first, the iPhone was a sustaining 
innovation in the smartphone market, but by changing their business model, 
Apple was able to connect application developers with end consumers and 
change what mainstream consumers use as a main point for accessing the 
internet, thus disrupting the personal computer market.18 
An important piece to disruption theory is that it is a process.19 Often, 
pundits misapply the theory because they are looking at a new product or 
service at a fixed point in time, but the path from gaining foothold in the 
low-end, moving upmarket, and eventually displacing an incumbent is what 
classic disruption theory is about.20 Christensen is basically qualifying new 
entrant’s strategic position as access-based, where customers are 
segmented, and although the needs of these customers are similar to other 
customers, the best way to service the segmented customers is different.21 
He highlights Uber as a perfect example of the misapplication of disruption 
theory because Uber lacked an access-based strategic position, opting for 
more of a variety-based position, where Uber could use its technological 
advancements to offer a distinctive set of activities to a segment of the 
market.22 Thus, Uber lacked the same type of process over time that is seen 
in traditional disruption theory.23 Uber is a great example because without 
                                                          
 14 Id. at 47. 
 15 Joseph L. Bower & Clayton M. Christensen, Disruptive Technologies: Catching the 
Wave, 7 HARV. BUS. REV. 43, 47 (1995). 
 16 Id. at 45. 
 17 Christensen et al., supra note 1, at 50 (highlighting Apple’s creation of a new market 
for internet access). 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. at 48. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Michael E. Porter, What is Strategy?, 74 HARV. BUS. REV. 61, 65-67 (1996) (Porter 
asserts that strategic positioning can be broken into three buckets that are not mutually 
exclusive: variety-based positioning, where firms produce a sub-set of the overall products 
in the market; needs-based-positioning, where firms focus on a particular customer group by 
serving all their needs; and access-based-positioning, where firms focus on providing 
services to a segment of the market that does not have access to the current offerings in the 
market). 
 22 Id. at 7. 
 23 See Christensen et al., supra note 1, at 48-50. 
Can Mobile Money Disrupt the Financial Services Industry? 
39:309 (2019) 
313 
the access-based strategic position, servicing the needs of customers at the 
low-end, Uber cannot move upmarket in the way that is required to meet 
the requirements of Christensen’s disruption theory.24 Labeling an 
innovation correctly becomes important for incumbents in an industry 
because disruption theory has empirically been shown to significantly be 
more accurate predicting which new businesses will succeed and pose a 
threat in the future.25 
In terms of mobile money, the framework for disruption theory is 
present because mobile money is a transformative product that is meeting 
the needs of an ignored segment of the market (unbanked population), and 
the incumbents (financial service companies) are increasingly working with 
technology companies to develop additive products and services to their 
most demanding customers.26 As will be demonstrated, mobile money 
providers have focused on the segmented part of the market (the unbanked) 
and have strategically positioned themselves to provide the similar services 
that all customers need in the financial services industry, but in a different 
way.27 The question then becomes, can mobile money providers move 
upmarket and truly disrupt the financial services industry? This is an 
important question because if mobile money can prove to be disruptive, the 
way consumers interact with financial products will be forever changed, 
and overall economic activity will increase substantially around the globe.28 
Moreover, mobile money could contribute to closing the wealth gap that 
exists between developing and developed countries, which also could 
increase global economic activity through international trade.29 
III. MOBILE MONEY SERVICE CASE STUDY: A LOOK AT M-
PESA’S SUCCESS IN KENYA 
During 2007, Safaricom launched a mobile money service called M-
                                                          
 24 See id. at 48-51 (highlighting Netflix as a better example of disruption theory because 
what made Netflix disruptive was the process it undertook, going from a mail service 
(providing little value) to a streaming service, which provided so much value that it got 
Blockbuster’s core customers to adopt). 
 25 Id. at 60. 
 26 Shanthi Elizabeth Senthe, Transformative Technology in Microfinance: Delivering 
Hope Electronically, 13 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 8-9 (2012). 
 27 Porter, supra note 21 (the ultimate determination on disruption will be whether 
mobile money can move upmarket, or if unwilling to meet the demands of increased 
regulations; mobile money providers hold their strategic positioning as a low-end provider in 
the financial services vertical segment). 
 28 See Daniel Runde, M-Pesa and the Rise of the Global Mobile Money Market, FORBES 
(Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielrunde/2015/08/12/m-pesa-and-the-rise-
of-the-global-mobile-money-market/54954dff5aec. 
 29 See Otiato Guguyu, World Bank Study Says Inequality Narrowing, STANDARD 
DIGITAL (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/m/article/2000218311/world-
bank-study-says-inequality-narrowing. 
Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 39:309 (2019) 
314 
Pesa in Kenya.30 At the time, about eighty percent of the Kenyan population 
did not have bank accounts (“unbanked”).31 Safaricom originally developed 
M-Pesa as a micro-finance tool that would allow lenders an easier way to 
collect payments that were due on the money they loaned out.32 However, 
during a pilot program, it was discovered that users were mainly 
transferring money to one another instead of making loan repayments.33 
After further research, Safaricom noticed there was a sizeable opportunity 
to create value for individuals to have a reliable, efficient, and inexpensive 
way to remit money to family members in other parts of the country.34 
Safaricom decided to pivot and rolled out a new product that allows users 
to: “check their account balance, make deposits and withdrawals, pay bills, 
purchase mobile phone credit, and transfer money to other users.”35 
Safaricom is the leading telecommunications provider in Kenya, and 
in 2007, when it launched M-Pesa, it had over seventy percent of the 
market share.36 While a vast majority of the population consisted of 
unbanked individuals, Kenya had a high percentage of the population that 
had access to a mobile phone, estimated at around fifty-five percent.37 
Safaricom’s near monopoly market share and the high penetration of 
mobile phone devices are key demographics that led to Safaricom’s launch 
of M-Pesa, but Safaricom’s ability to quickly establish a network of 
authorized agents, allowing convenient public access to M-Pesa is the 
driving force behind M-Pesa’s growth.38 At the time M-Pesa launched, 
there was an access issue with the traditional financial industry 
infrastructure; Kenya had fewer than one thousand automatic teller 
machines (ATM), less than seven hundred bank branches, and fewer than 
six hundred Western Union locations (many of which were in the banks).39 
Thus, individuals would store cash under their mattresses, and if they 
needed to send money to someone, they would typically pay a bus driver to 
deliver the money, pay a friend or neighbor to make the delivery, or take 
                                                          
 30 Olga Morawczynski, Exploring the Usage and Impact of “Transformational” Mobile 
Financial Services: The Case of M-PESA in Kenya, 3 J. E. AFR. STUD. 509, 509 (2009). 
 31 William Jack et al., Monetary Theory and Electronic Money: Reflections on the 
Kenyan Experience, 96 ECON. Q., 83, 84 (2010). 
 32 Morawcyski, supra note 30, at 510. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 510-11. 
 35 Id. at 509. 
 36 Tavneet Suri et al., Documenting the Birth of a Financial Economy, 109 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. U.S.A., 10257, 10257 (2012) (Safaricom’s near monopoly is a unique factor that 
has allowed M-Pesa to scale dramatically in Kenya, but has led to problems scaling in 
foreign countries where telecommunication market conditions are more competitive). 
 37 Morawcynski, supra note 30, at 511 (citing a 2008 study). 
 38 Suri et al., supra note 36, at 10257 (at the time of the study in 2012, Safaricom had 
established over 30,000 registered agents, but according to their website that number is not 
over 40,000 showing continuous rapid growth). 
 39 Id. 
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the risk of sending through the post office.40 By quickly establishing 
thousands of agents throughout the country, Safaricom was able to bridge 
the access gap, which led to M-Pesa’s dramatic early growth and 
adoption.41 
Mobile money differs from mobile banking in that mobile banking 
allows current banking customers to conduct transactions through a mobile 
platform, whereas mobile money users are not required to have a bank 
account.42 Subscriber identity modules (SIM) cards store customer value on 
users’ phones, which doubles as the user’s identity verification, as opposed 
to a traditional bank account number.43 A Mobile Network Operator (MNO) 
issues the notational equivalent value on the user’s SIM account, while the 
corresponding cash value gets collected by agents and then it is typically 
stored in a bank.44 The user then uses his or her mobile device to access the 
notational value on the SIM card and can direct payment or transfer 
instructions.45 
The lifecycle of a M-Pesa transaction would look similar to the 
following scenario. Customer walks into her local M-Pesa agent, which can 
be a Safaricom authorized dealer; another retailer such as a gas station, 
supermarket, and convenience store; or selected banks and other micro-
finance institutions.46 The agent is responsible for registering the customer 
into the M-Pesa network.47 After registration, the customer will deposit 
with the agent a certain amount of cash, which the agent receives and places 
an equal amount of credit onto the customer’s SIM card on her mobile 
handset.48 The agent is then responsible for holding the cash and then 
depositing it into the bank to be held on a more permanent basis.49 Once 
being registered and having deposited cash, the customer is free to send or 
receive cash from another user, pay bills and loans, or make an international 
transfer.50 The customer, at a later point, can also use the agent to make a 
withdrawal from her M-Pesa value and receive cash from the agent, and the 
                                                          
 40 Morawcynski, supra note 30, at 510. 
 41 Id. at 511 (Safaricom also strategically priced M-Pesa to be cheaper than the 
alternative options, allowing M-Pesa to have a competitive advantage on price and 
convenience). 
 42 Joseph Kariuki Nyaga, Mobile Banking Services in the East African Community: 
Challenges to the Existing Legislative and Regulatory Frameworks, 4 J. INFO. POL’Y 270, 
274 n.17 (2014). 
 43 Id. at 274. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 SAFARICOM, (last visited Feb. 21, 2018 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Kieron Monks, M-Pesa: Kenya’s Mobile Money Success Story Turns 10, CNN (Feb. 
24, 2017, 9:26 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/21/africa/mpesa-10th-anniversary/index.
html. 
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agent charges a small commission for the withdrawal, much like an out-of-
network ATM here in the United States.51 
Mobile money distinguishes itself from innovations in developed 
countries because it is a transformative innovation.52 Transformative 
products are able to “integrate unbanked populations into the formal 
financial sector.”53 In contrast, the advancements made in the United States, 
for example, such as Venmo, Apple Pay, and mobile banking apps are 
additive innovations.54 Additive products provide existing financial sector 
customers with new and more convenient channels to conduct 
transactions.55 
IV. ANALYZING THE KEY DEMOGRAPHICS THAT GIVES RISE 
TO SUCCESSFUL MOBILE MONEY VENTURES 
Mobile money is not exclusive to Kenya, as M-Pesa is just one 
example, highlighted because of the unique circumstances that has led to its 
success, but the mobile money industry is in fact much broader.56 The key 
demographics that have given rise to mobile money are: large percentage of 
population is unbanked due to access issues, high percentage of mobile 
phone users who are technologically savvy, and lack of alternatives for 
meeting the financial needs of the poorest consumers.57 Since the early 
2000s, there have been dozens of mobile money initiatives launched in over 
forty developing countries around the globe.58 
While M-Pesa has been the most successful service to date expanding 
to other countries in East Africa, India, and Eastern Europe, SMART 
Money in the Philippines was the first mobile money service to market, and 
was launched in the early 2000s.59 The Philippines possess a unique 
geographic makeup given that it is a country made up of over 7,500 
islands.60 This poses a similar access issue to the one seen in Kenya because 
only two thousand islands are inhabited and only half of those contain a 
                                                          
 51 SAFARICOM, supra note 46. 
 52 Senthe, supra note 26. 
 53 Id. at 9. 
 54 Id. at 8-9. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Lauren Dunn, What Leads to a Mobile Banking Program’s Success?: A Comparison 
of M-Pesa and EKO India Financial Services, J. PUB. & INT’L AFF. 108, 109 (2015). 
 57 See id. at 110-15. 
 58 Id. at 109. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Sophia Hasnain et al., Mobile Money in the Philippines: Market Conditions Drive 
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bank branch.61 Furthermore, the Philippines has over seventy percent 
unique mobile phone subscribers, which is higher than Kenya’s fifty-six 
percent.62 Mobile money, led by SMART Money, joined by GCash in 2004, 
has gained tremendous penetration in the Philippines because of the access 
issue and high acceptance of mobile phone subscribers.63 Additionally, like 
Kenya, the Philippines has a high SMS literacy, which provides trust in the 
system because users have confidence that the transfer will be conducted in 
a secure way.64 
South Africa is another example where mobile money service is 
finding success. Wizzit, established in 2004 by independent entrepreneurs 
and backed by South African Bank of Athens, helped lower the percentage 
of unbanked people in South Africa from forty-two percent in 2004 to 
twenty-three percent in 2016.65 In South Africa, similar to other countries 
where mobile banking has taken roots, Wizzit has replaced cash as the 
primary way to conduct transactions.66 The rural population had limited 
access to traditional banks due to lack of locations and the difficulty 
associated with travel to a bank.67 Wizzit mitigated the access gap by 
creating a solution that allows customers to conduct transactions without 
visiting a bank branch; consumers can make deposits via partnered ATM 
machines or through the South African Post Office.68 Wizzit, and mobile 
money in the broader context, served the key demographics segmented 
within the market by closing the access barrier that exists with traditional 
financial services in developing countries.69 
V. PROGRESSIVE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AS THE KEY TO 
SUCCESSFUL MOBILE MONEY GROWTH: A LOOK AT KENYA’S 
REGULATORY TREATMENT OF M-PESA 
When analyzing mobile money success, there are some key 
demographics that are necessary to support mobile money growth.70 These 
demographics are: high mobile phone penetration, large percentage of 
                                                          
 61 Id. (36% of the municipalities do not have a bank branch). 
 62 Id. 
 63 GROUPE SPÉCIALE MOBILE ASSOCIATION (GSMA), MOBILE MONEY IN THE 
PHILIPPINES—THE MARKET, THE MODELS AND REGULATION (2012), https://www.gsma.com/
mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Philippines-Case-Study-v-X21-21.pdf. 
 64 Id. 
 65 AfricaMe-Team, Wizzit: The Mobile Application Servicing South Africa’s 
Underprivileged, AFR. MIDDLE E., Sept. 8, 2016, http://africa-me.com/wizzit-mobile-
application-servicing-south-africas-underprivileged/. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 WIZZIT INT’L, http://www.wizzit-int.com/mobilebanking.html (last visited Nov. 9, 
2017). 
 69 Id. 
 70 See Nyaga, supra note 42, at 275-76. 
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unbanked individuals, competitive pricing when compared to the 
alternatives, and consumers’ skill level with mobile technology.71 However, 
there are cases of developing countries that contain the same demographics 
that have failed to see substantial growth in mobile money usage (the next 
section addresses these cases).72 A major difference between successful 
mobile money adoption and more choppy growth is how the individual 
countries central banks regulate mobile money.73 
The Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) has been lauded for its flexible and 
innovative approach in addressing mobile money, especially given how 
difficult it is to regulate because of the overlap between 
telecommunications and banking.74 Two key regulations that contributed to 
M-Pesa’s growth are the low requirements to open an account and the 
classification of mobile money as a non-banking activity.75 A user only is 
required to have a national identification card, which is issued to all Kenyan 
citizens, or a passport to open an M-Pesa account.76 In contrast, the process 
for opening a bank account is much more tedious.77 The low barrier to 
creating an account supports mobile money adoption because it keeps the 
access requirement to a minimum.78 Mobile money would not be able to 
provide any value to its consumers if it made opening an account just as 
difficult as opening a traditional bank account.79 Even when banks lowered 
initiation fees and waived identification requirements, consumers still chose 
not to establish bank accounts because they lacked trust in the banking 
system and MNOs were able to provide more value.80 Furthermore, banks 
were not able to leverage the low barriers to entry like MNOs because 
banks still could not bridge the access gap.81 
The most influential step the CBK took to support mobile money 
growth was to not over-regulate when Safaricom launched M-Pesa. Instead, 
the CBK worked with Safaricom, keeping an ongoing dialogue about how 
mobile money was being used by consumers, before coming up with 
                                                          
 71 Id. 
 72 See Models of Mobile Banking: The RBI’s Approach to the “Transformational” 
Model of Mobile Banking is Justified, 45 ECON. & POL. WEEKLY 7,7 (2010). 
 73 See Nyaga, supra note 42, at 284-86. 
 74 Id. at 275. 
 75 William Jack & Tavneet Suri, Risk Sharing and Transaction Costs: Evidence from 
Kenya’s Mobile Money Revolution, 145 AM. ECON. REV. 183, 187 n. 9; see supra note 72. 
 76 William Jack & Tavneet Suri, Risk Sharing and Transaction Costs: Evidence from 
Kenya’s Mobile Money Revolution, 145 AM. ECON. REV. 183, 187 n. 9. 
 77 Id. 
 78 See, Suri et al., supra note 36 (discussing how a key to M-Pesa’s success was 
establishing a network of agents to bridge the access gap). 
 79 See J. Brock Smith & Mark Colgate, Customer Value Creation: A Practical 
Framework, 15 J. MARKETING THEORY & PRAC. 7, 10 (2007) (the ease of opening an account 
would qualify as functional/instrumental value). 
 80 Dunn, supra note 56, at 112. 
 81 Porter, supra note 21. 
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sensible regulations that met the needs both sides.82 Safaricom did not want 
to have the CBK over-regulate in fear of regulations stalling growth 
momentum; the CBK wanted to implement financial inclusion in a 
responsible manner that did not promote fraud, anti-money laundering, or 
harm the consumer in any way.83 In fact, Safaricom reached out to the CBK 
prior to launching M-Pesa in an effort to work with the regulators, which 
led to financial inclusion for the roughly forty percent of the country that 
were unbanked.84 
Prior to launch, the CBK and Safaricom went back and forth over the 
details of Safaricom’s business plan, and, in late 2006, Safaricom provided 
the CBK with a detailed risk mitigation plan.85 Upon reviewing the plan, in 
early 2007, the CBK determined that M-Pesa was not banking activity and 
issued a “Letter of No Objection” to Safaricom for M-Pesa.86 The 
classification as non-banking activity allowed M-Pesa the flexibility to 
choose its agents, which was key to M-Pesa gaining penetration in such a 
short time period.87 
The CBK did not remain idle after issuing its Letter of No Objection.88 
It continually monitored M-Pesa, and in the midst of fraud allegations, 
ordered an audit of M-Pesa’s activities.89 Shortly after the audit, the CBK 
adopted measures in 2009 to allow agents, as third parties, to conduct 
business on behalf of banks.90 The 2009 regulation also prohibited 
Safaricom from locking up agents exclusively,91 which allowed for greater 
consumer protection by promoting competition.92 With agents free to work 
with multiple mobile money providers, and banks allowed the freedom to 
work with any agents, the CBK opened the door to banks competing with 
Safaricom.93 This was in response to banks’ lobbying efforts for more 
                                                          
 82 Simone di Castri & Lara Gidvani, The Kenyan Journal to Digital Financial Inclusion, 
GSMA, Aug. 1, 2013, https://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/
2013/07/MMU-Infographic-The-Kenyan-journey-to-digital-financial-inclusion.pdf. 
 83 See id. 
 84 See id. 
 85 See id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 See Models of Mobile Banking, supra note 72. 
 88 David E. Rodrigues Gonçalves, Financial Inclusion in Peru: Lessons From Kenya’s 
Regulatory Approach on E-Money, 21 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 31, 34-36 (2013). 
 89 Id. at 35. 
 90 Republic of Kenya, The Kenya Finance Act (2009), accessed May 3, 2019, 
https://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/MMU-
Infographic-The-Kenyan-journey-to-digital-financial-inclusion.pdf. 
 91 Republic of Kenya, The Kenya Competition Bill (2009), accessed May 3, 2019, 
https://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/MMU-
Infographic-The-Kenyan-journey-to-digital-financial-inclusion.pdf. 
 92 Id. 
 93 See also di Castri & Gidvani, supra note 82. 
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regulation of mobile money.94 The CBK faced significant tension balancing 
the policy concerns of promoting innovation to support financial inclusion, 
protecting consumers, and preventing unfair competition. Their response–to 
not over regulate, but allow more competition instead-was extremely 
innovative.95 
In 2013, the CBK took additional steps in their regulation efforts by 
drafting an E-money regulation framework.96 The CBK again, did not over 
regulate, but instead issued fifteen broadly worded clauses that outlined 
basic concepts of how mobile money should operate.97 Additionally, the 
CBK instituted a ten percent tax on fees Safaricom charges, which was 
good timing because they waited for wide spread adoption instead of taxing 
too soon and taking away M-Pesa’s cost advantage.98 In response to the tax, 
Safaricom raised M-Pesa’s pricing to match the increase and pass off the 
expense to the consumer.99 However, this did not affect usage because M-
Pesa had already made itself irreplaceable in Kenyan society.100 No one 
decision made by the CBK is dispositive in the growth of M-Pesa in Kenya, 
but the series of decisions made over the course of several years were 
instrumental in promoting financial inclusion. 
VI. M-PESA’S INABILITY TO CAPTURE THE SAME 
EXPONENTIAL GROWTH IN INTERNATIONAL MARKETS: A 
LOOK AT THE MORE STRINGENT REGULATIONS AND THEIR 
IMPACT 
Based off the lessons that Safaricom has learned from M-Pesa in 
Kenya, they have strategically targeted markets with the same or similar 
demographics that led to success in Kenya.101 However, M-Pesa has not 
reached the same level of success as they have with their initial launch.102 
While all of these countries have high unbanked populations and high 
percentages of mobile phone users, M-Pesa faced significantly tougher 
landscapes in countries outside of Kenya.103 The question becomes, is M-
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Pesa a product of circumstances where all the links in a strategic 
positioning formed a competitive advantage, or is there something else that 
has prohibited M-Pesa from gaining similar traction outside of Kenya?104 
In 2011, M-Pesa launched in India.105 On the surface, the opportunity 
for M-Pesa was quite clear, India is a country where the unbanked includes 
half of the over one billion people, and it is the second largest mobile phone 
market in the world with over nine hundred million active users.106 So why 
has growth been so difficult for M-Pesa in India? There are demographic 
factors that exist in India that are different from those in Kenya. Mainly, 
Vodafone, who owns Safaricom, is the second largest mobile operator in 
India.107 As previously mentioned, Safaricom, at the time they launched M-
Pesa, had a near monopoly on the mobile market in Kenya.108 This one 
difference has had a large impact because of the fact that transfers are much 
easier when conducted over the same mobile network.109 Even though being 
the second largest operator in India is a hurdle, it is not the determinative 
factor in why M-Pesa has struggled to gain acceptance.110 
The biggest blow to M-Pesa was the Reserve Bank of India labeling 
mobile money as a banking, rather than telecom service, which requires 
compliance with stricter rules.111 As such, the Reserve Bank of India 
requires M-Pesa to partner with a bank because the bank acts as a principal 
with the local agents, and is thus responsible for acts or omissions of the 
agents when a consumer is harmed.112 Moreover, M-Pesa does not have the 
same freedom to choose its agents as it does in Kenya, which makes it 
much more difficult to scale quickly.113 Additionally, the Reserve Bank of 
India requires a lengthy identification process in order to “cash out” with an 
agent and convert M-Pesa credit to cash.114 The far stricter regulatory 
landscape has proven to be extremely limiting to M-Pesa’s growth in India. 
These stricter regulations prove to be a huge threat to profitability for M-
Pesa because they eliminate the value that M-Pesa creates over alternative 
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options for unbanked individuals to conduct transactions.115 M-Pesa scaled 
quickly in Kenya because Safaricom was able to quickly set up an extensive 
network of agents to bridge the access gap, users were able to transfer 
money in a more affordable and safer way, and the user on the other side of 
the transaction is able to easily cash out at his or her local agent using the 
SIM card on his or her mobile devise as identification.116 
Mobile money struggles in the face of heightened regulations that exist 
in many countries around the world. However, there are over two and half 
billion people in the world that are unbanked, and just about half of them 
have cell phones, so there is a tremendous opportunity for mobile money to 
include these people in the financial services industry.117 How then should 
mobile money look to grow internationally outside of these pockets of 
success within individual countries? 
An interesting case study is that of Peru, where, in 2013, the Peruvian 
government regulated e-money before either a bank or MNO attempted to 
launch in its country.118 The regulations take a standard approach by 
defining e-money, what entities are authorized to conduct e-money 
transactions, establishing rules for non-bank issuers, transaction limits, and 
consumer protection protocols.119 Furthermore, the telecommunications 
agency of the Peruvian Government, OSIPTEL, imposed further regulations 
that promote fair competition for non-bank e-money issuers.120 
Additionally, the Peruvian regulations called for a more strict registration 
process for setting up an e-money account.121 
By establishing a clear regulatory framework, before mobile money 
launched, Peru established, in 2015, the world’s first national mobile 
payments system called BIM.122 The Peruvian government partnered with 
over thirty financial institutions and mobile networks to create a mobile 
payments platform that operates across all banks, mobile networks, and 
ATMs to fully incorporate its large unbanked population.123 In the first 
month, before fully being rolled out, BIM signed up over twenty-three 
                                                          
 115 See Smith, supra note 79. The value M-Pesa creates is providing a more affordable 
alternative to consumers, and the increased costs of complying with regulations inhibits M-
Pesa’s ability to successfully be more affordable. 
 116 See Suri et al., supra note 36. 
 117 Tim Cooper et al., Mobile Money in Peru: Assessing the Opportunity, GSMA MOBILE 
MONEY FOR THE UNBANKED PROGRAMME (2015), http://www.intermedia.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/GSMA-MMU-Peru-Report-English-.pdf. 
 118 Gonçalves, supra note 88, at 36-37. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 37. 
 121 Id. at 42-43. 
 122 APOLITICAL, https://apolitical.co/solution_article/perus-mobile-payment-system-
brings-banking-services-millions/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2017). APOLITICAL, https://apolitical.
co/solution_article/perus-mobile-payment-system-brings-banking-services-millions/ (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2017). 
 123 Id. 
Can Mobile Money Disrupt the Financial Services Industry? 
39:309 (2019) 
323 
thousand users, far surpassing the eight to ten thousand projected.124 At the 
time of launch, BIM already had over ten thousand service stations where 
users could deposit and withdraw cash, making adoption extremely easy.125 
By establishing a joint venture, led by the government, most banks and 
mobile operators feared they would be left out, so they joined the project 
allowing the consumers to benefit tremendously from the lack of rivalry.126 
As recently as last year, BIM was adding over twenty thousand new users 
per month, and has over four-hundred thousand users in total, conducting 
hundreds of thousands of transactions each month.127 
The Peruvian experiment proved that it can succeed, and the idea has 
already spread to nearby Paraguay, who is working to bring their key 
stakeholders together within the next eighteen months to create a similar 
joint venture.128 Given M-Pesa’s long standing issue of inoperability across 
networks, which has been solved recently, it appears that a joint venture 
may be the path forward for sustainable mobile money growth 
internationally.129 
VII. THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE 
DIFFERENT BUSINESS MODELS FOR MOBILE MONEY SERVICES 
OPERATIONS: A LOOK AT TELECOM AND BANK-LED VENTURES 
Before reviewing the opportunity for mobile money in developed 
countries where there are stricter regulations, it makes sense to quickly 
touch upon the different models for running a mobile money service. This 
is especially true given the example of a joint venture in Peru.130 There are 
two types of mobile money platforms: a telecommunications (telecom) led 
model and a bank-led model.131 In general the telecom-led model offers 
greater flexibility to scale because MNOs do not have to comply with the 
same strict financial regulations, but in terms of scaling internationally, 
regulators prefer bank-led models because of their fiscal stability.132 
Telecom-led models, like M-Pesa in Kenya, use a mobile phone’s SIM 
card to store information and SMS services to execute transfers over its 
telecom network.133 Telecom-led models are preferred by consumers 
because of the convenience they provide through the large system of agents 
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that can be established.134 However, a serious drawback to the telecom-led 
model has been the issue of inoperability between networks, meaning that 
both users have to be on the same mobile network in order to conduct a 
transfer.135 In a situation like Kenya, where Safaricom has a near monopoly 
on the mobile market, the telecom-led model works great because all the 
users on the one dominant network neutralizes the cross network issue.136 
Vodafone, the parent company of Safaricom, has found that without such a 
dominant position in the mobile market, international growth can be 
difficult, as previously discussed with M-Pesa’s slow growth in India.137 
Telecom-led models are also popular because they are able to leverage the 
marketing, product development, and agency management expertise of the 
MNOs.138 In contrast, banks struggle in this department because they lack 
trust in the community and the ability to monitor agents.139 Another 
criticism of the telecom-led model has been security, especially when it 
comes to withdrawals and identification.140 Proponents of bank-led models 
have continuously cited this as a reason to prefer a bank-led model because 
“banks are best positioned to provide banking products.”141 M-Pesa has 
countered this problem recently with an improved security enhancement 
that requires a user to have a picture taken when he or she register his or her 
SIM card, allowing agents to reference that photo from M-Pesa’s database 
and connect it to the SIM card making deposits and withdrawals.142 This 
feature is designed to curb any fraudulent activities, anti-money laundering, 
or terrorist financing.143 
The alternative option to a telecom-led model is a bank-led model, 
which has been successful in countries such as Pakistan, with their mobile 
money product Easy Paisa.144 The advantages of a bank-led model are: 
financial stability through increased trust in the liquidity of the bank, users 
can transact with one another across mobile networks, and there is greater 
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access to other banking products, which promotes even greater financial 
inclusion.145 The downside has been lack of extensive network of agents 
leading to a decrease in convenience for the consumer and lack of trust in 
traditional banks.146 However, it is conceivable that a bank-led model is 
more apt at pursing international growth because it does not face the same 
regulatory risks as a telecom-led model and it can overcome the barrier of 
stricter government regulations.147 
Both models have their advantages and disadvantages, which is why 
the joint venture experiment in Peru is so intriguing.148 A joint venture can 
leverage the expertise of both the banks and the MNOs, while working 
alongside government regulators to come up with a solution that is 
convenient yet still possess the necessary consumer protection safeguards. 
This type of model has real potential to spread internationally, even into 
developed countries that have an established banking network. 
VIII. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
AND HOW THE FRAMEWORK IS SO FOCUSED ON CONSUMER 
PROTECTION, IT PREVENTS TRANSFORMATIVE INNOVATION: A 
LOOK AT THE UNITED STATES 
Now that there is an understanding of the different models of mobile 
money that have been used, it is prudent to see how these different models 
would be treated by a strict regulatory scheme, such as the United States’, 
to see if mobile banking can gain traction in countries that only have a 
smaller percentage of unbanked populations. In order for mobile money to 
be disruptive it would have to gain traction in developed countries where 
mainstream consumers of financial products conduct business. The United 
States has a well-developed financial regulatory framework that takes 
consumer protection extremely seriously, making it a good example to 
analyze.149 Additionally, the United States has approximately nine million 
(seven percent of the population) unbanked households, and twenty-four 
and half million underbanked households (twenty percent of the 
population), meaning there is a potential market for mobile money.150 
While the market opportunity isn’t as big as developing countries, the 
promising growth over the last decade for mobile money services indicates 
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there is potentially a sizeable market in the United States.151 The 
opportunity also exists for mobile money to garner the attention of the 
population that uses traditional financial services products if it can position 
itself to add value to gain adopters.152 
Beginning with a telecom-led model, it is clear this model would 
struggle the most to deal with a regulatory framework like the United 
States’ system. The Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), would classify mobile money 
providers as a money service business (MSB), which requires compliance 
with certain administrative and reporting requirements.153 These 
requirements include: 
 developing an effective anti-money laundering (AML) program; 
 designation of a person to assure day-to-day compliance with the 
BSA; 
 incorporate internal policies and controls to assure compliance with 
the BSA; 
 provide education and training to personnel; 
 conduct independent reviews to monitor and maintain the AML 
program; and 
 exhaustive reporting requirements.154 
Not only do the increased administrative and reporting requirements 
significantly increase costs, but also the designation as a MSB increases a 
providers liability because they come under the oversight of both the 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).155 The Dodd-Frank act created the 
CFPB, which is legislation passed in response to the 2008 financial crisis.156 
The CFPB has both supervisory and enforcement authority over MSBs.157 
Supervisory authority allows the CFPB to formally investigate an MSB; 
while enforcement authority allows the CFPB “to bring an enforcement 
action against an MSB for its acts and practices involving consumers.”158 
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FinCEN is part of the United States Treasury Department, and is 
responsible for monitoring compliance with BSA and prosecuting those that 
fail to comply.159 While this paper mainly addresses federal regulations, 
while analyzing the United States, it is worth mentioning that each state has 
its own regulations that must be complied with, mainly each state (except 
Montana) requires a MSB to license in that state to conduct business across 
state lines.160 
The BSA also poses a problem for a telecom-led model because of the 
identification requirements surrounding transactions.161 As mentioned 
earlier, one of the key regulatory advantages that Kenya provided M-Pesa, 
was the softened identification requirement for opening an account and 
conducting transactions.162 Preventing fraud and money laundering has long 
been the basis for proponents of increased regulation of mobile money.163 
Although, M-Pesa has taken steps recently to increase the level of 
identification required, it does not rise to the level of the BSA.164 
M-Pesa’s struggles in India are evidence that a telecom-led model 
would struggle also in the United States because telecommunication 
companies lack the ability to handle the administrative and reporting 
requirements involved with offering a financial product, and they have 
shown an unwillingness to absorb the risk of liability for the acts of their 
agents.165 Under the Dodd-Frank Act, a mobile money provider would be 
liable for the acts of its agents, and a simple allegation of unfair, deceptive, 
and abusive practices (UDAAP) from a consumer is all the CFPB needs to 
open an investigation and potentially bring an enforcement action against 
the mobile money operator.166 This is obviously a significant amount of 
risk, much more risk than the regulatory schemes in Kenya and the 
Philippines enforced on their telecom-led mobile money products.167 
Therefore, it appears that telecom-led models are more a product of key 
demographics and a progressive regulatory authority in order to promote 
adoption. It is thus evident that a telecom-led model would most likely not 
have the capabilities to be a disruptive innovation on the global scale 
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because it cannot overcome a strong, well established regulatory 
framework. 
Turning to a bank-led model, there is much more opportunity for 
banks to make the push for mobile money growth internationally.168 Banks 
are in a better position than telecommunication companies to meet the 
demands of increased regulations in countries who have a more developed 
regulatory landscape.169 Since banks already offer financial products to the 
public, they have the internal infrastructure already established to meet the 
demands of increased reporting requirements, which can significantly 
decrease risk of being fined for non-compliance.170 Additionally, banks do 
not have to rely on a transaction revenue model, which allows them to offer 
mobile money services at a more affordable price.171 Banks can earn 
revenue through traditional banking methods, such as lending, deposits, and 
insurance products.172 A potential side-effect of a bank-led model is that it 
promotes financial inclusion because banking services become more 
accessible to those who have previously been unable to take advantage, 
providing banks with an incentive to focus more on the low-end of the 
market.173 
The bank-led model does have some drawbacks in terms of 
international growth. In developing countries, banks still need to get over 
the hurdle of lack of consumer trust in the banking system.174 In United 
States, banks do not seem interested in serving the approximately thirty-five 
million unbanked or underbanked people; instead they seem focused on 
creating additive products for already existing customers (discussion about 
the state of the U.S. financial tech market is in the next section).175 
Moreover, banks need a way to get around having to rely on the 
telecommunication companies in order to get their mobile money product 
running on customers cell phones.176 One example is Equity Bank in 
Kenya, trying to compete with M-Pesa, which provides customers with 
another SIM card that inserts into the customers phone on top of the 
existing SIM card, and users can access their account through the new SIM 
card.177 This bridges the access gap because users do not need to visit a 
branch to conduct a transaction.178 However, this is not a perfect solution 
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because it is an extra step required in order to open an account, and as it has 
been seen, just the slightest barrier to convenience has proven to be difficult 
for growth. 
Looking at the pros and cons of both the telecom-led model and the 
bank-led model, while also assessing the success of the joint venture trial in 
Peru, it appears that a joint venture would be best to gain traction in a 
developed country such as the United States. Telecommunication 
companies can leverage their expertise in marketing, product development, 
and they have an established network of brick and mortar locations all over 
the country.179 While banks can leverage their compliance infrastructure to 
meet the increased regulatory requirements. If the government got involved 
as well, (it appears they have interest given their biannual survey of the 
unbanked and underbanked) it can work with both the telecommunication 
companies and the banks to provide the best possible service to allow every 
member of society a chance to be included in the financial system. 
IX. CURRENT STATE OF THE FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY 
(FINTECH) MARKET IN THE UNITED STATES: A STORY OF 
ADDITIVE INNOVATION 
Since there is an argument that mobile money has a market in the 
United States, given the number of unbanked or underbanked people, it 
makes sense to examine the current state of the fintech market in the United 
Sates to see whether mobile money can be a true disruptive force.180 As it 
stands right now, “much of the innovation in fintech is really in the delivery 
system, rather than the product itself.”181 Meaning, most of the recent 
innovations in fintech have been focused on speeding up the process of 
monetary transmissions.182 Examples include: Apple Pay, Android Pay, 
Masterpass, Samsung Pay, Venmo, and Zelle Pay. To use any of these 
“innovative” services, a customer must have a bank account (or credit/debit 
card) linked to the services so the fintech company does not have to register 
as an MSB.183 
It is worth noting that the United States is not taking the lead in terms 
of fintech regulation, that distinction belongs to the United Kingdom.184 
The United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has authorized 
a “fintech sandbox,” which allows start-ups and current market participants 
to offer a product or service to a limited consumer base before having to 
                                                          
 179 Senthe, supra note 26. 
 180 See Christensen, supra note 1. 
 181 BANKING TECHNOLOGY, supra note 160. 
 182 Id. 
 183 See Credit Slips, http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2014/09/apple-pay-and-the-
cfpb.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2017). 
 184 BANKING TECHNOLOGY, supra note 160. 
Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 39:309 (2019) 
330 
meet the applicable regulations.185 The FCA’s experiment, launched in 
2016, allows for consumers to decide if the cutting edge of the fintech 
market can be useful for them, while allowing for innovation through the 
use of beta testing.186 While this seems like a creative way to balance the 
promotion of innovation with consumer protection, critics claim that the 
risk of consumer harm far outweighs the need for such innovation, and thus 
the experiment is dangerous.187 
After examining the current state of the fintech market, the opportunity 
for mobile money to be a disruptive force does exist.188 Due to the stiff 
regulatory framework previously discussed, fintech companies are 
partnering with banks so they don’t have to register as a MSB and they can 
leverage the compliance expertise of the banks.189 The partnership with 
banks also makes sense for fintech companies because the majority of the 
population has a bank account, so in order to quickly disseminate their 
service into the market and grow, it makes sense to provide a service that 
most of the population would find useful.190 However, this makes most of 
the innovation additive, while still leaving the bottom of the market 
unserved, and thus exposed.191 Therefore, there is an opportunity for mobile 
money to gain a low-end foothold in the markets of developed countries 
using a joint venture model to leverage the innovation of technology 
companies and the regulatory and administrative foundation of financial 
services companies.192 
X. CONCLUSION 
Mobile money has been transformative in promoting financial 
inclusion in the developing world. With half the world’s population without 
a bank account, there is tremendous opportunity for global growth, and 
there eventually could be a day where more money is transacted through 
mobile money than through traditional financial networks. In terms of 
opportunities in developed countries, there is an opportunity to establish a 
low-end foothold because traditional financial services are moving 
upstream through their additive innovations, leaving the low-end of the 
market completely unserved. The question becomes, can mobile money 
gain the attention of the mainstream consumer base and move upstream to 
disrupt the financial services industry? The ultimate answer is most likely 
not. While, incumbent players are turning away from the low-end of the 
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market, they are doing so in a way that adds the same value to their current 
customer base that mobile money would, that being an easy, efficient way 
to transfer money. With the growth of venmo, zelle pay, and now the ability 
to transfer money using Apple Pay over Apple’s iMessage network, it does 
not appear that mobile money has the ability to add value to the mainstream 
consumer. If, through a joint venture between banks, telecommunication 
companies, and the government, mobile money is able to create a micro-
finance loan product (which is happening in the developing world), there is 
more of an opportunity to attract some middle-class consumers in the 
developed world, especially if the loan terms are more favorable than 
traditional banks, and the consumer can use the mobile money platform to 
pay off the loan, providing convenience. The most likely scenario for 
mobile money is that more countries follow in Peru’s path, and establish 
joint ventures. A joint venture would allow for inclusion in the financial 
services industry for the low-end of the market, thus increasing overall 
economic activity globally. 
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